
President Donald Trump vowed to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of taking office, a timeframe later extended to within the first 100 days of his second term. With that milestone in sight, his goal remains elusive as Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shows no genuine interest in ending the hostilities as long as his forces maintain momentum on the battlefield — despite U.S. recognition of Russian control over Crimea and the removal of sanctions imposed since 2014 being offered as incentives.
Trump now appears to be losing patience both with Putin (“Vladimir, STOP!”) and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky (“GET IT DONE”). He may be preparing to shift the full burden of the peace process onto the EU, which would likely have to lift its own Russia sanctions to secure a durable agreement and step up its defense spending to provide credible security guarantees for Ukraine once a ceasefire is reached. It is unclear if the U.S. would continue intelligence sharing or military aid for Kyiv if it were to move on from negotiations, or whether Trump would make good on his threat to impose additional sanctions on Russia and secondary tariffs on its oil exports.
To be sure, the Ukraine peace talks occupy relatively little space in the public mind as Americans increasingly worry about the way Trump is managing the economy, inflation, and tariff policy. His net approval is underwater on all three counts (by 11.4 percentage points, 22.4 points, and 18 points respectively, according to an average of recent polls), as the U.S. stock market is headed for some of its worst performance since 1928.
Fifty-four percent of Americans disapprove of the way Trump is handling foreign policy, and 55% feel that way about his approach to the situation in Ukraine. Fewer than half, 47%, believe he is committed to achieving peace between Ukraine and Russia, even though 69% view the issue as important to U.S. national interests. All in all, between an impasse in Ukraine (and in Gaza), Trump’s “no rush” approach to tariff talks, and turmoil in the U.S. national security and diplomatic ranks, some 59% of voters, including a third of Republicans, believe America is losing credibility on the global stage — potentially opening the door to China to fill the gap.
The latest ceasefire proposal out of Moscow may be the clearest sign yet that Putin’s ultimate goal is long-term political dominion over Ukraine and an end to its NATO aspirations, rather than mere territorial expansion. But instead of helping move the ceasefire process forward, Trump’s “final offer” to Ukraine, predictable reactions from Zelensky and European allies, and a lack of progress on the president’s minerals deal with Kyiv provide further evidence that Trump’s foreign policy agenda may be running out of steam.
“There was no Tariff ‘exception’,” President Trump insisted on Truth Social after news emerged that smartphones, computers, semiconductor chips, and other electronics had been excluded from the China duties announced days earlier. (They remain subject to a 20% duty related to the U.S. fentanyl crisis.)
Those category-specific levies were “just moving to a different Tariff ‘bucket’” by way of a new investigation into the national security implications of importing semiconductors and chipmaking equipment. The probe, which also covers pharmaceuticals and drug ingredients, could result in tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, the mechanism already in use to justify duties on imported steel, aluminum, and autos. Other Section 232 investigations currently underway are focused on lumber, copper, critical minerals and the products that use them, such as electric vehicles, batteries, and wind turbines.
“I don’t change my mind, but I’m flexible” is a sentiment Trump has voiced more than once when discussing tariffs. He has previously ruled out sector and category-specific carve-outs as something that could be viewed as weakening the thrust of his tariff agenda. Now he seems open to exempting made-in-China car parts from 20% fentanyl-linked duties and 25% duties on steel and aluminum, although a separate 25% levy on all auto components is still due to take effect from May 3. He has floated additional exemptions for autos, semiconductors, and other sectors — essentially opening up his administration’s rulemaking to direct input from industry. Automakers speculate that a permanent reprieve from tariffs could hinge on an expanded definition of “U.S. content” in USMCA-produced cars and parts, but a formal process for taking advantage of a U.S. content deduction could take weeks to develop.
The White House has cited plans by Nvidia, Honda, and others to expand production in the U.S. as evidence that Trump’s policies are having an impact — even though other companies are pausing spending out of concern that tariffs could result in higher input prices. But the Trump administration’s impromptu approach to tariffs and carve-outs can also be understood — especially when viewed from China’s perspective — as a sign of its relatively weak position that is pushing it to grant exemptions to U.S. manufacturers dependent on global (especially Chinese) supply chains while at the same time undermining its own goal of bringing more manufacturing stateside. An eventual de-escalation with Beijing over tariffs, a possibility of which is being broached by Trump officials and Trump himself, would be one way to square that circle.
After weeks of speculation, it’s official: Elon Musk is dialing down his business hours as an informal head of DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) following a bruising quarter for Tesla and concerns about an impact of President Trump’s China tariffs on the company’s fast-growing energy storage segment. His decision is good news for the automaker, which has faced political backlash in multiple markets that is far from being offset by the brand’s uptick in popularity among Republicans.
For DOGE, a potential impact from Musk’s semi-retirement (he still plans to spend a day or two per week on “government matters”) is harder to gauge. On the one hand, his popularity is on the decline, driven almost entirely by Democrats and independent voters, which negatively affects the quasi-government agency’s public image. In fact, Democratic strategists are looking to position Musk and his work at DOGE as a lightning rod to stoke voters’ anti-Trump sentiment ahead of next year’s midterm elections. From a political standpoint, DOGE could do well seeing less of Musk.
On the other hand, judging from other Musk ventures, most notably Tesla and X, a decline in his day-to-day involvement could lead to operational inefficiencies and weaker performance. Americans like the general idea of DOGE but not necessarily its performance to date, and have mixed feelings about its pace of operations (33% want it to work at its current pace, 28% to slow down, and 33% to stop entirely). Less micromanagement from Musk could allow DOGE to reassess its tactics and potentially deliver the savings its supporters expect.
Conversely, a lack of daily oversight could make it even more prone to errors and inaccuracies and likely to mishandle Americans’ personal data, an area of bipartisan concern. We are curious to see how Musk’s partial retreat from DOGE could affect the agency’s ability to help congressional Republicans identify areas of potential savings as their efforts to craft a party-line package that makes President Trump’s 2017 tax cuts permanent shift into high gear.