The past two weeks — and President Donald Trump’s first year back in office more broadly — have been a prime example of policymaking at the speed of social media, namely the @realDonaldTrump account on Truth Social. Trump’s 180-degree reversal on a push to acquire Greenland has dealt a blow to the transatlantic alliance, nudging some NATO member states toward closer trade ties with China and hurting MAGA’s credibility among the European far right.
At home, though, voters have been largely unimpressed with the president’s pursuit of American greatness abroad: Trump’s net job approval stands at -12 percentage points (43% approve vs. 55% disapprove), near an all-time low, according to an average of latest polls. His net approval on foreign policy is also -12 points, with just 6% of voters viewing developments abroad as the country’s most important issue. Outside his loyal MAGA base, Americans are skeptical about Trump’s exploits on the global stage: 49% say his policies have weakened the U.S.’s position in the world and 54% expect his actions to have a negative impact on global peace and stability in 2026.
Trump has recently rolled out a series of populist economic policies aimed at lowering prices, some of them borrowed from a Democratic playbook. Still, he remains 30 points underwater on the cost of living: 51% of voters say his policies are making things less affordable, and 74%, including 49% of Republicans, say he is not doing enough to address the issue. More broadly, 57% say Trump is focused on the wrong things, including 62% of independent voters who tend to decide elections.
That same disconnect is evident on immigration, where Trump’s net approval is -18, including -27 among independents. Even though half of voters approve of his handling of the U.S.-Mexico border and support his immigration policy goals, 63% oppose his hardline tactics, and 61% say aggressive enforcement actions — which have left two people dead and sparked nationwide protests — are a bridge too far. Black and Latino voters are disproportionately likely to disapprove of Trump on immigration; those groups shifted right in 2024, and both parties are vying for their votes in this year’s midterms.
Despite broad disenchantment with Trump on the economy and immigration, voters still prefer the Republican approach on both issues over a Democratic one (33% to 25% on the economy, 39% to 29% on immigration). Yet they are 5 points more likely to back a generic Democrat to represent them in Congress, including a 15-point edge among independents. That gives Democrats breathing room to coalesce around a set of positive messages beyond affordability — especially on immigration, where a Republican outcry in Congress and backlash from within the MAGA media ecosystem is pushing the administration to lower the pressure. Trump allies are urging the president to settle on a message of his own as he embarks on a schedule of regular campaign travel, but whether he is able to stay on message is anyone’s guess.
Between pressuring NATO allies over Greenland, keeping military options against Iran in play, and hinting at a push for regime change in Cuba, President Trump has been taking a noticeably softer tone toward China. His administration’s new national defense strategy downgrades China to a regional priority level secondary to the Western Hemisphere, seeking to maintain a “favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific” to prevent Chinese dominance in the region.
The Trump-Xi trade truce, reached last fall, remains broadly in place, and 2026 has not brought a major new round of tariff escalation, although narrower, previously scheduled measures can still take effect. Against that calmer backdrop, the administration has approved sales of Nvidia’s H200 AI chips to China and greenlit a TikTok restructuring into a majority U.S.-owned entity — moves that have drawn sharp criticism from Republicans in Congress. It has also withdrawn a proposed rule to restrict Chinese drones, dropped an expected rule on Chinese medium- and heavy-duty trucks, and pushed out the official who led the office that had effectively blocked most China-linked connected cars from the U.S. market on national security grounds in 2024.
Barring unforeseen developments, some China watchers expect a relatively quiet year, with both sides avoiding significant moves until after the November midterms — which take place just days after the current trade truce is set to expire, meaning that its key elements, such as suspended restrictions on China’s rare earths exports, will likely be extended in some form beforehand. The administration will likely want a longer runway for its own push to build out domestic and allied critical minerals supply chains, which includes a $1.6 billion investment in an American rare-earths miner. (A February ministerial meeting on critical minerals could offer early signs of whether the administration can translate its rhetoric into practical coordination with allies and partners.)
Ahead of Trump’s planned visit to Beijing in April, a key uncertainty is the Supreme Court’s pending decision on challenges to the administration’s use of “emergency” tariff powers for “reciprocal” and fentanyl-related duties. If the court limits that tool, the administration’s next move, and Beijing’s response, will be a key test of whether the current calm holds.
Canada’s decision to reduce tariffs on some Chinese EVs from 100% to the country’s most-favored-nation rate of 6.1%, part of a new strategic partnership that also anticipates Chinese investment in Canadian auto production, illustrates how the Trump administration’s trade rhetoric and policies have disrupted auto industries across North America. The initial imports are set to be small, but the move would give Chinese manufacturers (in addition to Tesla, a likely early winner) a foothold in the North American market while potentially further eroding the competitiveness of U.S. automakers such as GM and Ford outside U.S. borders.
Once allowed in, affordable and innovative Chinese cars tend to gain traction: their market share in Mexico grew to nearly 20% in five years before the government raised tariffs on made-in-China cars to 50%, unless manufacturers also produce locally — a provision from which some U.S. automakers will also benefit. It may be a matter of time before Chinese-brand vehicles enter the U.S. through the northern or southern border, although officially importing them would remain difficult, not only because of a 100% tariff but also due to federal rules governing connected car technology and vehicle safety standards.
Speaking at a recent event in Detroit, President Trump again invited Chinese automakers to set up manufacturing in the U.S., and some, like Geely, have signaled interest. But the idea typically faces opposition from organized labor and lawmakers in both parties, which could make it a nonstarter in an election year.
Trump administration officials have criticized Canada’s move to open its market to Chinese vehicles, with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick hinting it could factor into the upcoming USMCA review this summer. As that review approaches, Canada’s tariff shift may become an early test of whether the region can reconcile competitiveness and investment priorities with a tougher posture on China-linked trade in its shared auto market.
