Nearly a week into the U.S. war with Iran — precisely the kind of open-ended, costly military engagement President Donald Trump has repeatedly pledged to avoid — the White House has yet to articulate a consistent strategic rationale for joining Israeli strikes on Iranian targets for the second time in less than a year. In June 2025, U.S. involvement was framed narrowly around degrading Iran’s nuclear capabilities, helping push Israel’s twelve-day air campaign toward a ceasefire that held until now. This time, the Trump administration’s stated objectives have vacillated between preempting an “imminent threat” to U.S. forces, limiting Tehran’s ability to develop nuclear and long-range weapons, and regime change. It has offered little clarity on the likely duration of the conflict or whether it could involve U.S. ground forces, and left open a question of U.S. casualties which Trump has suggested could rise if fighting continues.
Early data indicates the operation is unpopular. Between 50% and 59% of voters disapprove, according to various polls, and 51% say Trump’s handling of Iran has made the U.S. less safe. A majority (59%), including 68% of independent voters, say they do not trust the president to make the right decisions about the use of force in Iran. These views broadly resemble public reactions to the June 2025 strikes and the U.S. incursion into Venezuela earlier this year, underscoring persistent skepticism toward overseas military action. (Broad support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq remains a notable exception.) Republicans are more supportive, but a meaningful minority say Trump lacks a clear plan (17%) or have little or no trust in his decision-making on Iran (14%). They are also evenly divided on whether U.S. involvement could become long-term.
Republicans in Congress, including some who opposed Trump’s actions in Venezuela, have largely rallied behind him. But outside the party establishment, prominent members of MAGA’s isolationist wing have argued that the administration’s approach contradicts the America First ethos and that it has failed to make a persuasive public case for escalation. If the conflict drags on, it could deepen tensions within Trump’s coalition and reopen disputes over what America First should mean in practice and who best represents it within the party. Further U.S. casualties and potential domestic threats such as last weekend’s shooting in Austin, Texas, could add strain just as midterm campaigning accelerates. As long as fighting continues, Trump and congressional Republicans may also find it harder to keep the focus on cost-of-living issues, which are widely expected to matter most to voters come November.
In practical terms, the Supreme Court ruling canceling President Trump’s tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and the administration’s move to impose a temporary, across-the-board 10% duty under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (soon to become 15% for most countries, except possibly the EU), has produced relatively little immediate change for businesses or consumers. The average effective tariff rate remains high at about 13%, down from roughly 16% before the IEEPA ruling. That rate could fall to about 9% if the Section 122 tariff expires after 150 days and is not replaced or extended by Congress.
The ruling does not affect tariffs imposed under other authorities, including Section 301 (used to address unfair trade practices and heavily concentrated on Chinese imports) and Section 232 (national security tariffs covering products such as steel, aluminum, autos and parts). Section 232 goods are exempt from Section 122, as are USMCA-compliant goods from Canada and Mexico, reducing the risk of “stacking” on top of existing tariffs. Other categories, including critical minerals and other sensitive inputs, are also carved out from the new Section 122 surcharge.
Even so, the ruling and the Section 122 response introduce meaningful legal and economic uncertainty for importers and global supply chains. Like IEEPA tariffs, Section 122 is legally untested, making court challenges likely — although its brief duration makes it possible that it expires in July before litigation reaches a decisive stage. For importers, claiming refunds for IEEPA tariffs — more than $175 billion in total, over 60% of all tariff revenue received in 2025 — could take much longer, considering that the Supreme Court did not specify how that should be done. Politically, both parties are staking their own messaging around the issue: the administration is exploring ways to preserve some revenue to help finance tax policy enacted last year, while Democrats are pressing for rapid refunds and tying the controversy to cost-of-living pressures.
The administration has indicated it may expand tariffs under Section 301 and invoke Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which allows country-specific levies of up to 50% in response to discriminatory trade conduct. For consumers, economists expect prices to grow in the near term, upping the pressure on Republicans in congressional districts where manufacturing and agriculture have been hit the hardest by the trade measures. Polling shows Americans disapprove of Trump’s tariffs by a 30-point margin (34% in favor vs. 64% opposed), including nearly three-quarters of independent voters and about a quarter of Republicans. Yet voters are divided on who they trust to better handle the cost of living, with equal shares naming Trump (32%) and Democrats in Congress (31%), while 33% say they trust neither. This dynamic creates an opening for both parties: Republicans can argue that tariffs are part of Trump’s broader negotiating strategy, while Democrats can tie continued price pressure to household budgets — all but ensuring that tariffs remain a major pressure point through 2026.
A looming legal decision on whether Congress can cancel California’s Clean Air Act waiver could leave automakers navigating a split U.S. emissions landscape, potentially requiring significant adjustments in costs, product plans, and EV strategy. At the center is California’s long-standing ability — via waivers granted by the Environmental Protection Agency — to enforce more stringent vehicle pollution standards than the federal government, an approach followed by 11 other states.
California is challenging Congress’s use of the Congressional Review Act to nullify the waivers, arguing it wrongly treated EPA waiver decisions as “rules” eligible for fast-track repeal. The Trump administration is seeking to get the case dismissed while pursuing a broader rollback of federal climate and vehicle regulation, including EPA’s moves to rescind the 2009 greenhouse gas “endangerment finding” and repeal federal tailpipe emissions standards for cars and trucks it underpins. If that rollback survives its own legal challenges, federal oversight of fleet-wide emissions would largely shift to Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rules.
As the case remains unresolved, automakers continue to make major business decisions under uncertainty. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) has told manufacturers they can decide for now whether to follow the new standards, while warning that penalties could apply later for noncompliance if the state ultimately wins; many are reportedly choosing to comply anyway. For automakers, the outcome could reset EV sales requirements across a large share of the U.S. market, alter compliance costs, and change the value of regulatory credits — a particularly important consideration for EV-only companies like Tesla that generate revenue by selling surplus credits to other automakers.
