As the dust settles following President Donald Trump’s announcement of a two-week Iran ceasefire, questions remain about how the six-week military operation’s aftermath could impact Republicans’ chances in the approaching midterm elections and with them, the rest of Trump’s second-term policy agenda.
Since the start of the war, Trump’s job approval, historically the clearest predictor of the ruling party’s midterm performance, has dipped below 40% (16 percentage points underwater, according to a polling average), trailing any recent predecessor at a similar point in his tenure. Still, Trump’s standing with his core supporters — self-identified MAGA Republicans and a somewhat broader coalition of his 2024 voters — has barely budged, suggesting that his vision of “America First” as proactive, high-stakes interventionism on a global scale is largely in synch with their own despite vocal pushback from prominent right-wing media figures.
One metric that has begun to shift is the Trump electorate’s approval of the way he is managing the war. It is down roughly 10 points since early March, coupled with a steady decline in the share of his voters who “strongly” support his handling of the conflict, according to a series of Economist/YouGov weekly polls — suggesting a degree of unease, even among his most fervent backers, with his incendiary rhetoric and scorched-earth tactics.
If the Iran ceasefire holds, enabling safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, we may see some shifts within the peripheral segments of the Trump 2024 universe — among non-MAGA Republicans (roughly a quarter of all Republican voters) and independents who helped swing the election Trump’s way in four out of seven battleground states. Among both groups, support for the war and the president’s job approval has plummeted. However, any rally-around-the-flag effect is likely to be minor, considering a significant gap in intensity between those who “strongly oppose” and those who “strongly support” Trump’s actions in Iran and his policies more generally. Even before the first U.S. missiles were fired at Iranian targets, the consistent decline in public support of Trump 2.0 has been driven primarily by his cratering net approval on kitchen-table issues, such as the economy (-22 points), trade (-24 points), and inflation (-34 points).
Trump himself will not be on the midterm ballot, but his weak polling numbers could impact down-ballot races, pushing swing voters to the left and keeping politically disengaged ones home, especially if prices of gasoline and other staples stay high. Democrats remain unpopular but they hold a 6-point edge on voters’ preference for the party to represent them in Congress and a 31-point lead among those with a negative view of both parties, another group that broke in Trump’s favor in 2024. Earlier this week, a Democrat performed stronger than expected in a special House election in Georgia, adding to a series of swings toward Democrats in conservative districts and putting on notice the 20 or so House Republicans who won in 2024 by 10 points or less. Barring a quick, durable Iran peace deal, which few outside the MAGA inner core think possible, Democrats could do well to use any lingering war-related drag on prices and supply chains to keep their base engaged and energized in the weeks ahead.
A year ago, in early April, President Trump used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose blanket duties on much of America’s imports, driving the effective tariff rate (the share of total U.S. imports collected in duties) from 2% to roughly 21%, the highest in a century. Weeks ago, a Supreme Court ruling overturned the so-called Liberation Day tariffs, pushing that rate down to 11% and leaving the administration with a patchwork of industry- and product-specific duties tied to national security concerns under Section 232 and unfair trade practices under Section 301. Other sectors and product categories remain exempt, while goods from countries that have reached trade deals with the administration face lower rates, often in exchange for commitments to shift production to the U.S. All in all, the administration has revised tariff policy at least 50 times (most recently adjusting duties on steel, aluminum, and copper), with further changes likely when a 10% Section 122 tariff covering many goods previously taxed under IEEPA expires in July.
The White House argues that the tariffs have stimulated domestic investment and won valuable concessions from America’s trading partners. In practice, the results are mixed. Some manufacturers have managed to blunt the impact by reconfiguring supply chains and expanding U.S. operations, but they have done so amid declining payrolls and slower new factory construction. For consumers, the cost of living continues to rise, adding to growing disenchantment with Trump’s economic policies even among his base. Since January, Trump’s economic approval rating has fallen 14 percentage points among Republicans, compared with an 8-point drop among voters overall, and 28% of Republicans now say his policies have worsened economic conditions. Heading into the midterms, Democratic campaign officials view congressional Republicans’ support for tariffs as a political liability, although their opportunity seems to reflect less renewed public confidence in their own agenda than the extent to which anti-Trump sentiment is pushing dissatisfied voters away from his party. What remains to be seen is whether Democrats can translate anti-Trump sentiment into lasting economic credibility.
Preliminary talks are underway for the review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) agreement, which covers $1.6 trillion worth of annual trilateral trade in goods, most of it tariff-free (except for a few exemptions, such as a levy of 25% on medium- and heavy-duty trucks and 50% on steel, aluminum, and copper). The Trump administration has indicated it wants to push for a series of changes that would create more manufacturing and jobs in the U.S., establish stricter rules on what counts as a North American product, and potentially tighten rules of origin for autos beyond the current requirement for 75% North American parts and 70% North American steel and aluminum content. It also wants to reduce reliance on outside inputs, especially China-linked or other “non-market” supply chains, and plans to use the review process to press Canada and Mexico on a wider set of issues, including closer coordination on tariffs, export controls, investment screening, and critical minerals.
The parties have until July to decide whether they support the renewal of the trilateral pact for another 16 years, until 2042. Experts envision three possible outcomes as the talks continue through the summer and fall: (1) an extension of the existing agreement with separately negotiated, targeted side deals in sectors like autos and digital services, (2) a new three-way deal with stricter rules of origin, national content requirements, labor standards, or limits on investment from China, or (3) new bilateral agreements replacing USMCA, possibly after one of the parties withdraws, which can be done with a six-month notice. The latter two outcomes would likely face legal challenges and require approval of Congress, keeping uncertainty high — especially considering that member countries could at any point unilaterally raise tariffs or impose trade restrictions, as the U.S. has already done on several occasions. We will be watching the review process and keep you informed of any relevant developments.
